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Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?

Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?

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  • Create Date：2022-05-21 06:57:56
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  • Author：Graham Allison
  • ISBN：1328915387
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Summary

NATIONAL BESTSELLER | NEW YORK TIMES NOTABLE BOOK OF THE YEAR。 From an eminent international security scholar， an urgent examination of the conditions that could produce a catastrophic conflict between the United States and China？？—？？and how it might be prevented。

China and the United States are heading toward a war neither wants。 The reason is Thucydides’s Trap: when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling one， violence is the likeliest result。 Over the past five hundred years， these conditions have occurred sixteen times; war broke out in twelve。

At the time of publication， an unstoppable China approached an immovable America， and both Xi Jinping and Donald Trump promised to make their countries “great again，” the seventeenth case was looking grim？？—？？it still is。 A trade conflict， cyberattack， Korean crisis， or accident at sea could easily spark a major war。

In Destined for War， eminent Harvard scholar Graham Allison masterfully blends history and current events to explain the timeless machinery of Thucydides’s Trap？？—？？and to explore the painful steps that might prevent disaster today。

SHORT-LISTED FOR THE 2018 LIONEL GELBER PRIZE
NAMED A BEST BOOK OF THE YEAR BY: FINANCIAL TIMES * THE TIMES （LONDON）* AMAZON

“Allison is one of the keenest observers of international affairs around。” ？？—？？ President Joe Biden

“[A] must-read book in both Washington and Beijing。” ？？—？？ Boston Globe

“[Full of] wide-ranging， erudite case studies that span human history 。 。 。 [A] fine book。”？？—？？ New York Times Book Review

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Reviews

Kathy Nealen ，

Thoughtful analysis on past rival relationships between two countries or empires。 Using that information， the author reviews various scenarios that could happen between the US and China。 Then he makes recommendations on how we could proceed strategically to avoid war and especially a nuclear war。 Interesting topic given the conflict we have with Russia now over their invasion of Ukraine。

MeltingIcecream ，

One Word - Terrifying。 Great read。

Horace Derwent ，

Introduction I have written my work， not as an essay to win theapplause of the moment， but as a possession for alltime。—Thucydides， History of the Peloponnesian War Here we are on top of the world。 We have arrived atthis peak to stay there forever。 There is， of course，this thing called history。 But history is somethingunpleasant that happens to other people。—Arnold Toynbee， recalling the 1897 diamond jubileecelebration of Queen Victoria Like other practicing historians， I am often asked whatthe Introduction I have written my work， not as an essay to win theapplause of the moment， but as a possession for alltime。—Thucydides， History of the Peloponnesian War Here we are on top of the world。 We have arrived atthis peak to stay there forever。 There is， of course，this thing called history。 But history is somethingunpleasant that happens to other people。—Arnold Toynbee， recalling the 1897 diamond jubileecelebration of Queen Victoria Like other practicing historians， I am often asked whatthe “lessons of history” are。 I answer that the onlylesson I have learnt from studying the past is thatthere are no permanent winners and losers。—Ramachandra Guha “Ah， if we only knew。” That was the best the Germanchancellor could offer。 Even when a colleague pressedTheobald von Bethmann Hollweg， he could not explainhow his choices， and those of other Europeanstatesmen， had led to the most devastating war theworld had seen to that point。 By the time the slaughterof the Great War finally ended in 1918， the key playershad lost all they fought for: the Austro-Hungarian Empiredissolved， the German kaiser ousted， the Russian tsaroverthrown， France bled for a generation， and Englandshorn of its treasure and youth。 And for what？ If weonly knew。Bethmann Hollweg’s phrase haunted the president ofthe United States nearly half a century later。 In 1962，John F。 Kennedy was forty-five years old and in hissecond year in office， but still struggling to get his mindaround his responsibilities as commander in chief。 Heknew that his finger was on the button of a nucleararsenal that could kill hundreds of millions of humanbeings in a matter of minutes。 But for what？ A sloganat the time declared， “Better dead than red。” Kennedyrejected that dichotomy as not just facile， but false。 “Ourgoal，” as he put it， had to be “not peace at theexpense of freedom， but both peace and freedom。” Thequestion was how he and his administration couldachieve both。As he vacationed at the family compound on Cape Codin the summer of 1962， Kennedy found himself readingThe Guns of August， Barbara Tuchman’s compellingaccount of the outbreak of war in 1914。 Tuchmantraced the thoughts and actions of Germany’s KaiserWilhelm and his chancellor Bethmann Hollweg， Britain’sKing George and his foreign secretary Edward Grey，Tsar Nicholas， Austro-Hungarian emperor Franz Joseph，and others as they sleepwalked into the abyss。 Tuchmanargued that none of these men understood the dangerthey faced。 None wanted the war they got。 Given theopportunity for a do-over， none would repeat thechoices he made。 Reflecting on his own responsibilities，Kennedy pledged that if he ever found himself facingchoices that could make the difference betweencatastrophic war and peace， he would be able to givehistory a better answer than Bethmann Hollweg’s。Kennedy had no inkling of what lay ahead。 In October1962， just two months after he read Tuchman’s book，he faced off against Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev inthe most dangerous confrontation in human history。 TheCuban Missile Crisis began when the United Statesdiscovered the Soviets attempting to sneak nuclear-tippedmissiles into Cuba， a mere ninety miles from Florida。 Thesituation quickly escalated from diplomatic threats to anAmerican blockade of the island， military mobilizations inboth the US and USSR， and several high-stakes clashes，including the shooting down of an American U-2 spyplane over Cuba。 At the height of the crisis， which lastedfor a tense thirteen days， Kennedy confided to hisbrother Robert that he believed the chances it wouldend in nuclear war were “between one-in-three andeven。” Nothing historians have discovered since haslengthened those odds。Although he appreciated the dangers of hispredicament， Kennedy repeatedly made choices he knewactually increased the risk of war， including nuclear war。He chose to confront Khrushchev publicly （rather thantry to resolve the issue privately through diplomaticchannels）; to draw an unambiguous red line requiringthe removal of Soviet missiles （rather than leave himselfmore wiggle room）; to threaten air strikes to destroythe missiles （knowing this could trigger Soviet retaliationagainst Berlin）; and finally， on the penultimate day ofthe crisis， to give Khrushchev a time-limited ultimatum（that， if rejected， would have required the US to fire thefirst shot）。In each of these choices， Kennedy understood that hewas raising the risk that further events and choices byothers beyond his control could lead to nuclear bombsdestroying American cities， including Washington， DC（where his family stayed throughout the ordeal）。 Forexample， when Kennedy elevated the alert level of theAmerican nuclear arsenal to Defcon II， he made USweapons less vulnerable to a preemptive Soviet attackbut simultaneously relaxed a score of safety catches。 AtDefcon II， German and Turkish pilots took their seats inNATO fighter bombers loaded with armed nuclearweapons less than two hours away from their targets inthe Soviet Union。 Since electronic locks on nuclearweapons had not yet been invented， there was nophysical or technical barrier preventing a pilot fromdeciding to fly to Moscow， drop a nuclear bomb， andstart World War III。With no way to wish away these “risks of theuncontrollable，” Kennedy and his secretary of defense，Robert McNamara， reached deeply into organizationalprocedures to minimize accidents or mistakes。 Despitethose efforts， historians have identified more than adozen close calls outside Kennedy’s span of control thatcould have sparked a war。 A US antisubmarinecampaign， for example， dropped explosives around Sovietsubmarines to force them to surface， leading a Sovietcaptain to believe he was under attack and almost firehis nuclear-armed torpedoes。 In another incident， thepilot of a U-2 spy craft mistakenly flew over the SovietUnion， causing Khrushchev to fear that Washington wasrefining coordinates for a preemptive nuclear attack。 Ifone of these actions had sparked a nuclear World WarIII， could JFK explain how his choices contributed to it？Could he give a better answer to an inquisitor’s questionthan Bethmann Hollweg did？The complexity of causation in human affairs has vexedphilosophers， jurists， and social scientists。 In analyzinghow wars break out， historians focus primarily onproximate， or immediate， causes。 In the case of WorldWar I， these include the assassination of the Hapsburgarchduke Franz Ferdinand and the decision by TsarNicholas II to mobilize Russian forces against the CentralPowers。 If the Cuban Missile Crisis had resulted in war，the proximate causes could have been the Sovietsubmarine captain’s decision to fire his torpedoes ratherthan allow his submarine to sink， or a Turkish pilot’serrant choice to fly his nuclear payload to Moscow。Proximate causes for war are undeniably important。 Butthe founder of history believed that the most obviouscauses for bloodshed mask even more significant ones。More important than the sparks that lead to war，Thucydides teaches us， are the structural factors that layits foundations: conditions in which otherwise manageableevents can escalate with unforeseeable severity andproduce unimaginable consequences。ARE THE US AND CHINA DESTINED FOR WAR？The world has never seen anything like the rapid，tectonic shift in the global balance of power created bythe rise of China。 If the US were a corporation， it wouldhave accounted for 50 percent of the global economicmarket in the years immediately after World War II。 By1980， that had declined to 22 percent。 Three decades ofdouble-digit Chinese growth has reduced that US shareto 16 percent today。 If current trends continue， the USshare of global economic output will decline further overthe next three decades to just 11 percent。 Over thissame period， China’s share of the global economy willhave soared from 2 percent in 1980 to 18 percent in2016， well on its way to 30 percent in 2040。China’s economic development is transforming it into aformidable political and military competitor。 During theCold War， as the US mounted clumsy responses toSoviet provocations， a sign in the Pentagon said: “If weever faced a real enemy， we would be in deep trouble。”China is a serious potential enemy。The possibility that the United States and China couldfind themselves at war appears as unlikely as it wouldbe unwise。 The centennials recalling World War I，however， have reminded us of man’s capacity for folly。When we say that war is “inconceivable，” is this astatement about what is possible in the world—or onlyabout what our limited minds can conceive？As far ahead as the eye can see， the defining questionabout global order is whether China and the US canescape Thucydides’s Trap。 Most contests that fit thispattern have ended badly。 Over the past five hundredyears， in sixteen cases a major rising power hasthreatened to displace a ruling power。 In twelve ofthose， the result was war。 The four cases that avoidedthis outcome did so only because of huge， painfuladjustments in attitudes and actions on the part ofchallenger and challenged alike。The United States and China can likewise avoid war，but only if they can internalize two difficult truths。 First，on the current trajectory， war between the US andChina in the decades ahead is not just possible， butmuch more likely than currently recognized。 Indeed， onthe historical record， war is more likely than not。 Byunderestimating the danger， moreover， we add to therisk。 If leaders in Beijing and Washington keep doingwhat they have done for the past decade， the US andChina will almost certainly wind up at war。 Second， waris not inevitable。 History shows that major rulingpowers can manage relations with rivals， even those thatthreaten to overtake them， without triggering a war。 Therecord of those successes， as well as the failures， offersmany lessons for statesmen today。 As GeorgeSantayana noted， only those who fail to study historyare condemned to repeat it。The chapters that follow describe the origins ofThucydides’s Trap， explore its dynamics， and explain itsimplications for the present contest between the US andChina。 Part One provides a succinct summary of the riseof China。 Everyone knows about China’s growth but fewhave realized its magnitude or its consequences。 Toparaphrase former Czech president Václav Havel， it hashappened so quickly that we have not yet had time tobe astonished。Part Two locates recent developments in US-Chinarelations on the broader canvas of history。 This not onlyhelps us understand current events， but also providesclues about where events are trending。 Our reviewstretches back 2，500 years， to the time when the rapidgrowth of Athens shocked a dominant martial Spartaand led to the Peloponnesian War。 Key examples fromthe past 500 years also provide insights into the waysin which the tension between rising and ruling powerscan tilt the chessboard toward war。 The closest analogueto the current standoff—Germany’s challenge to Britain’sruling global empire before World War I—should give usall pause。Part Three asks whether we should see current trendsin America’s relations with China as a gathering storm ofsimilar proportions。 Daily media reports of China’s“aggressive” behavior and unwillingness to accept the“international rules-based order” established by the USafter World War II describe incidents and accidentsreminiscent of 1914。 At the same time， a dose ofself-awareness is due。 If China were “just like us” whenthe US burst into the twentieth century brimming withconfidence that the hundred years ahead would be anAmerican era， the rivalry would be even more severe，and war even harder to avoid。 If it actually followed inAmerica’s footsteps， we should expect to see Chinesetroops enforcing Beijing’s will from Mongolia to Australia，just as Theodore Roosevelt molded “our hemisphere” tohis liking。China is following a different trajectory than did theUnited States during its own surge to primacy。 But inmany aspects of China’s rise， we can hear echoes。What does President Xi Jinping’s China want？ In oneline: to make China great again。 The deepest aspirationof over a billion Chinese citizens is to make their nationnot only rich， but also powerful。 Indeed， their goal is aChina so rich and so powerful that other nations willhave no choice but to recognize its interests and give itthe respect that it deserves。 The sheer scale andambition of this “China Dream” should disabuse us ofany notion that the contest between China and theUnited States will naturally subside as China becomes a“responsible stakeholder。” This is especially so given whatmy former colleague Sam Huntington famously called a“clash of civilizations，” a historical disjunction in whichfundamentally different Chinese and American values andtraditions make rapprochement between the two powerseven more elusive。While resolution of the present rivalry may seemdifficult to foresee， actual armed conflict appears distant。But is it？ In truth， the paths to war are more variedand plausible （and even mundane） than we want tobelieve。 From current confrontations in the South ChinaSea， the East China Sea， and cyberspace， to a tradeconflict that spirals out of control， it is frighteningly easyto develop scenarios in which American and Chinesesoldiers are killing each other。 Though none of thesescenarios seem likely， when we recall the unintendedconsequences of the assassination of the Hapsburgarchduke or of Khrushchev’s nuclear adventure in Cuba，we are reminded of just how narrow the gap isbetween “unlikely” and “impossible。”Part Four explains why war is not inevitable。 Most ofthe policy community and general public are naivelycomplacent about the possibility of war。 Fatalists，meanwhile， see an irresistible force rapidly approachingan immovable object。 Neither side has it right。 If leadersin both societies will study the successes and failures ofthe past， they will find a rich source of clues from whichto fashion a strategy that can meet each nation’sessential interests without war。The return to prominence of a 5，000-year-oldcivilization with 1。4 billion people is not a problem to befixed。 It is a condition—a chronic condition that will haveto be managed over a generation。 Success will requirenot just a new slogan， more frequent presidentialsummits， or additional meetings of departmental workinggroups。 Managing this relationship without war willdemand sustained attention， week by week， at thehighest levels in both governments。 It will require adepth of mutual understanding not seen since the HenryKissinger–Zhou Enlai conversations that reestablishedUS-China relations in the 1970s。 Most significant， it willmean more radical changes in attitudes and actions byleaders and the public alike than anyone has yetundertaken。 To escape Thucydides’s Trap， we must bewilling to think the unthinkable—and imagine theunimaginable。 Avoiding Thucydides’s Trap in this case willrequire nothing less than bending the arc of history。 。。。more

Ady ZYN ，

Capcana lui Tucidide， remarcă istoricul Graham Alisson， este un fenomen care se petrece la mai multe niveluri când o nouă forță se ridică， încât stârnește frica în forța care-și manifesta până atunci supremația și-o face pe aceasta să reacționeze în moduri violente。 Dacă în piața liberă companiile noi provoacă convulsii puternice celor tradiționale făcându-le să ia măsuri drastice， în relațiile internaționale acest fenomen poate produce convulsii cu consecințe grave la scară globală。 Tucidide te Capcana lui Tucidide， remarcă istoricul Graham Alisson， este un fenomen care se petrece la mai multe niveluri când o nouă forță se ridică， încât stârnește frica în forța care-și manifesta până atunci supremația și-o face pe aceasta să reacționeze în moduri violente。 Dacă în piața liberă companiile noi provoacă convulsii puternice celor tradiționale făcându-le să ia măsuri drastice， în relațiile internaționale acest fenomen poate produce convulsii cu consecințe grave la scară globală。 Tucidide teoretizează fenomenul pe baza experienței războiului peloponesiac desfășurat între anii 431 îen - 404 îen， între Sparta， care era puterea dominantă în acea perioadă și Atena， polisul aflat în ascensiune și care-și reclădea de acum o nouă matcă într-o postură superioară。 Rearanjarea noii structuri ateniene produs de ascensiunea ei a declanșat o reacție violentă de păstrare a status quo-ului din partea Spartei。 "Capcana lui Tucidide — scrie Allison — se referă la perplexitatea firească， inevitabilă， care se produce atunci când o putere în ascensiune amenință să dea la o parte o putere conducătoare。 Această situație poate surveni în orice sferă。 Dar implicațiile ei sunt mult mai periculoase în afaceri internațional"。 Iar precedentele nu sunt optimiste。 "În ultimii cinci sute de ani， în șaisprezece cazuri o putere majoră în ascensiune a amenințat să înlăture puterea conducătoare。 În douăsprezece dintre acestea， rezultatul a fost războiul。 Cele patru cazuri care au evitat acest deznodământ au realizat acest lucru cu ajutorul unor adaptări uriașe și dureroase de atitudini și acțiuni， atât din partea celui contestat， cât și din partea contestatorului"。Trăind într-o epocă relativ liniștită， denumită Pax Americana， am căzut și eu în eroarea politicii inevitabilității， pe care Timothy Snyder a descris-o în Drumul spre nelibertate， și am crezut că omenirea tinde inevitabil spre o eră de pace aceasta venind ca o culme a civilizației pe care umanitatea aproape că a atins-o。 Nimic mai greșit se pare。 La fel a indus în eroare o mulțime de cititori， inclusiv cititori situați în funcții de putere， și Norman Angell cu romanul său， din 1909， The great illusion， susținând cum că o economie interdependentă transformă războiul într-o iluzie inutilă。 Cinci ani mai târziu， iluzia căpăta o realitate tristă， repetată după câteva decenii。 Tot timpul există tendința spre anarhie a sistemului internațional， care este ținută sub control de-o autoritate unică ce domină， în interesul propriu， ceilalți actori prin forța sa militară， capacitatea politică și organizațională， capacitatea sporită în inovație și tehnologie， resurse și demografie。 După al doilea război mondial， această autoritate， hegemonul， au fost Statele Unite ale Americii， care au instalat așa numita Pax Americana survenită după altă epocă în care， în secolul al XIX-lea， puterea mondială era deținută de Anglia， perioadă denumită Pax Britanica。 Obiceilul hegemonului pacificator este încă din antichitate， atunci când imperiile sau regatele controlau echilibrul de forță în favoarea lor。 Roma， la apogeul gloriei ei a stabilit o perioadă de pace globală denumită Pax Romana， iar înainte， cetatea Spartei domina în zona Greciei antice。 Totodată， hegemonul n-are stabilită întâietatea pentru totdeauna， iar o altă forță se poate ridica să-i conteste întâietatea moment în care poate apărea o situație de criză ce se rezolvă adesea în moduri sângeroase。 Allison are ca punct de pornire a argumentației lui prima astfel de perioadă， contestarea supremației Spartei de către cetatea Atenei， din secolul al V-lea îen， documentată într-un mod fără egal în acea perioadă de marele istoric Tucidide。 Civilizația Atenei progresează atât de mult într-o perioadă scurtă de timp， încât provoacă hegeomnul vremii， cetatea concurentă， Sparta。 Conflictul este unul sângeros care marchează dramatic istoria Greciei antice și-o înscrie practic pe-o traiectorie descendentă fără ca să-și mai revină vreodată la aceeași valoare de dinaintea marelui conflict câștigat， a la Pirus， până la urmă de Sparta。 Asemenea conflicte au avut loc deseori de-a lungul istoriei， însă Allison analizează succint， dar concludent pe cele din ultimii cinci sute de ani detaliind mai mult conflicul Anglo-German de la începutul secolului al XX-lea， premergător primului război mondial și concentrându-se cu migală asupra conflictului （deocamdată mai mult potențial）， din istoria prezentă， dintre hegemonul America și puterea în ascensiune， China。 Forțele politice ale actorilor internaționali se întrepătrund de-a lungul trecerii veacurilor schimbând， în căutarea puterii și bunăstării， destinele popoarelor。 America a fost o Atenă pentru hegemonul Britanic al sfârșitului secolului al XIX-lea。 Când Theodor Roosvelt a preluat puterea la începutul secolului al XX-lea， dorința lui de expansiune și civilizare a popoarelor barbare din emisfera vestică au condus la retragerea Angliei și Spaniei din vecinătatea Lumii Noi。 Declinul Angliei a continuat odată cu conflictul mocnit cu o Germanie dornică să devină o forță colonială și care să doboare Anglia cu orice preț。 După două războaie mondiale sângeroase， America a luat locul Angliei la cârma politicii globale instalând o pace care durează până azi。 America a devenit Sparta。 Totuși o altă Atena pare a se ridica și contesta vigoarea Americană și totodată pacea mondială。 Datele sunt alarmante pentru America， iar o pace chinezască， Pax Sinica ar putea veni cu schimbări majore și greu de intuit la nivel global。După ce la mijlocul secolului al XIX-lea， occidentul a umilit China， aceasta a suferit o revigorare odată cu câștigarea războiului civil de către comuniștii lui Mao， iar în ultimii patru zeci de ani economia a ajuns la un nivel incredibil suflându-i în ceafă americanului， care e încă pe primul loc， un popor care are ca parte a identității naționale ideea că primatul economic este un drept inalienabil; totuși， sub multe aspecte — producția de vapoare， oțel， aluminiu， mobilă， îmbrăcăminte， textile， telefoane mobile și computere， producția de autoturisme și piața lor， China a depășit liderul mondial și e gata să-l provoace spre a obține supremația globală。 Și ca să ne facem o idee despre avântul chinezesc， să ne gândim că „Astăzi， muncitorii din China sunt pe un sfert tot atât de productivi față de omologii lor americani。 Dacă în următorul deceniu devin numai pe jumătate tot atât de productivi ca americanii， economia Chinei va deveni de două ori mai mare decât a SUA。 Dacă va egala productivitatea americanilor， China va avea o economie de patru ori mai mare decât cea a SUA。” La nivelul acesta de productivitate， în 2005， China reușea să contruiască echivalentul în metri pătrați ai Romei la fiecare două săptămâni， iar în cincisprezece ani a reușit să construiască echivalentul întregului fond de locuințe al Europei。 În perioada 1996-2016 a reușit să depășească cu 50% America la cel mai lung sistem de șosele conectând 95% din satele țării prin 4 milioane de km de șosele， plus 113。000 km de autostrăzi。 Și la căi ferate de mare viteză， China construiește 20。000 km pe care transportă pasageri cu o viteză de 300 km/h。 De la începutul acestui avânt economic， adică din 1981 până în 2004， China reușește să scoată din sărăcie extremă peste o jumătate de miliard de oameni。 SUA sunt depășite de China chiar și la numărul de miliardari încă din 2015， azi generând câte unul la fiecare săptămână jumătate。 Dacă la începutul anilor 80， aproape 90% dintre chinezi trăiau doar cu 2$ pe zi， după 40 de ani， doar 3% mai trăiesc cu suma aceasta， odată ce venitul pe cap de locuitor a crescut， din 1980， de la 193$ la peste 8100$ astăzi。 Dacă fostele imperii și-au construit puterea pe mare， China e decisă să domine într-un mod mai complex activând Drumul Mătăsii într-un mod la o scară colosală în care dorește să investească 1。4 trilioane de dolari， în 900 de proiecte， echivalentul a 12 planuri Marshall， prin care să unească 65 de țări din Asia， Europa și America de Nord， însumând cu totul 4。4 miliarde de oameni; One Belt One Road este conceptul în spatele căruia China vrea să construiască o rețea de autostrăzi， trenuri de mare viteză， aeroporturi， porturi， conducte， linii electrice și cabluri de fibră optică întinse pe toată suprafața Eurasiei generând noi legături diplomatice， comerciale și financiare。China este deja un colos economic și e pe cale să se înzdrăvenească lucru care l-ar fi tulburat teribil până și pe Napoleon care zicea: „Lăsați China să doarmă; când se va trezi， va face lumea să se cutremure。” Cu câtiva ani înainte să acceadă Napoleon la putere， Lordul George Macartney ajungea， în 1793， la Beijing din partea regelui Angliei， George al III-lea pentru a deschide ambasadă și permisiunea de a stabili un loc pentru negustorii englezi。 Împăratul Qianglong， din dinastia Qing， nu satisface nicio doleanță， iar lordul pleacă cum a venit。 Civilizația chineză era complet diferită de orice civilizație a întâlnit Anglia până atunci。 Cu centrul orientat spre împărat， care era considerat conducătorul absolut， așezat în vârful ierarhiei politice și universale， conducător al tuturor statelor， ce îi erau vasale， China era statul etnocentric cu o societate închisă în care și supușii， dar și statele， conform normei confucianiste， trebuiau să-și cunoască locul， anume de inferioritate față de împărat。 Oamenii și statele gravitau în jurul împăratului într-o ordine care impunea cultura ca lucru suprem al civilizației umane， coerciția fiind disprețuită， iar armata fiind ultima soluție。 Principiile de ordine socială a guvernării interne， bazate pe armonia ierarhiei se reflectau și-n politica externă; relațiile externe ale Chinei erau ierarhice și non-egalitare， puterile regionale fiind așteptate să prezinte supunere față de Beijing。 Politica externă a Chinei clasice consta din trei puncte: revendicarea dominației regionale; impunerea convingerii țărilor vecine că trebuie recunoscută și respectată superioritatea inerentă chineză; folosirea acestei dominații și superiorități pentru a armoniza coexistența cu vecinii。 Dominația Chinei în zona ei geografică nu implica o relație tensionată cu vecinii săi。 Ea nu avea tendința universalistă pe care o are America cu toate că ambele țări se simt datoare să joace un rol important în istorie。 Dorința Chinei a fost de a avea statutul special recunoscut de către țările vecine și barbare și， ca urmare， ea oferea diverse privilegii comerciale。 Timp de mii de ani cultura chineză era absorbită și admirată de toate statele mai mici， iar chinezii considerau că aceasta este ordinea universului。 Cu toate acestea， China trece printr-un șoc când， prin anii 30 ai secolului al XIX-lea occidentul se confruntă imperiul și-l supune într-un mod jenant pentru orgoliul chinezesc。 De atunci， până la victoria lui Mao， din 1949， China este dominată de imperialismul străin și abia în ultimile decenii ale secolului al XX-lea capătă potențialul de a deveni din nou în frunte conform ideologiei sale străvechi schimbând balanța economiei globale în favoarea ei。 „China a crescut de la 10% din economia SUA la 60% în 2007， 100% în 2004 și 115% astăzi （2017）。 Dacă tendința din prezent va continua， economia Chinei va fi cu 50% mai mare decât cea a SUA în 2023。 În 2040， ar putea fi de trei ori mai mare。 Aceasta înseamnă că China va avea de trei ori mai multe resurse decât SUA pentru a influența deznodământul relațiilor internaționale。” În condițiile actuale， dominația americană， bazată în primul rând pe armată， este susținută de un buget de apărare enorm față de ceilalți competitori。 În 2016， bugetul american pentru apărare depășea bugetele Chinei， Rusiei， Germaniei și Japoniei la un loc。 Și cifrele sunt susținute de mediul economic al țării respective; cum economia este un mediu dinamic， variațiile negative ale pieței pot influența evoluția economică impactul asupra ei fiind și el un indicator al performanței economice。 Criza financiară din 2008 a semnalat problemele economiilor occidentale și capacitatea reală a economiei chinezești。 Dacă rata de creștere a economiilor occidentale s-a prăbușit， cu SUA care a stagnat la o medie de 2% și econoiile europene scăzând mai accentuat， doar China a reușit， după o scurtă perioadă de scădere， în 2008， să aibă o economie în creștere constantă medie pe an cu 7%， rezultând că 40% din întreaga creștere globală de după 2007 s-a petrecut în China。Oare China este gata curând să provoace hegemonul actual， America， pentru întâietatea economică？ Și cum se va desfășura acest conflict între două culturi diferite？ Strategia chinezească nu urmează un clișeul agresiv afișat de civilizația occidentală。 Pentru strategii chinezi， războiul este în primul rând psihologic și politic， desfășurarea militară fiind pe plan secund。 Ei nu caută să obțină o victorie decisivă din prima， ci urmăresc să-și îmbunătățească poziția treptat chiar dacă aceasta costă foarte mult timp， de ordinul anilor chiar。 Idealul chinez este de a acumula cu răbdare avantaje relative， cu subtilitate， întocmai ca în jocul de Go。 Strategia occidentală este complet diferită， bazată pe ciocnirea dintre forțe și obținerea rapidă a rezultatelor。 Jocul de șah este o imagine potrivită acestui stil de luptă。 Allison raportează prezentul la trecut în acel demers al istoriei aplicate de a arunca o lumină asupra dificultăților și alegerilor curente， analizând precedentele și analogiile istorice。 Istoricul Michael Howerd notează că „tot ce credem despre prezent depinde de ceea ce credem despre trecut”。 Și trecutul e plin de învățăminte。 Această magistrală carte ne poate deschide ochii minții nu doar nouă， cititorilor amatori， ci și experților în domeniul politicii externe și chiar oficialilor guvernamentali。 Nu degeaba „Este cartea care a avut cel mai mare impact în domeniul relațiilor internaționale în ultima decadă。” 。。。more

Sohaib Alhalaybeh ，

حتميَّة الحرببين القوة الصاعدة والقوة المهيمنة هل تنجح الصين وأمريكا في الافلات من فخ ثيودسيديديز ؟ثيودسيديديز؛ هو مؤرخ يوناني صاحب كتاب تاريخ الحرب البيلوبونيسية الذي يؤرخ للحرب بين أثينا وأسبرطة التي نشبت عام 431 قبل الميلاد وانتهت بعد سبعة وعشرين سنة。 لكن السؤال هنا ما دخل تاريخ اليونان القديم بما يحدث اليوم بين الصين وأمريكا؟ فخ ثيودسيديديز هو عندما تمثل قوة صاعدة تهديداً لقوة سائدة فاتحة المجال لتغير قوياً للقوى السائدة حالياً ومغيراً لنطام العالم。 وهو مشتق من صعود الدولة-المدينة أثينا ضد ا حتميَّة الحرببين القوة الصاعدة والقوة المهيمنة هل تنجح الصين وأمريكا في الافلات من فخ ثيودسيديديز ؟ثيودسيديديز؛ هو مؤرخ يوناني صاحب كتاب تاريخ الحرب البيلوبونيسية الذي يؤرخ للحرب بين أثينا وأسبرطة التي نشبت عام 431 قبل الميلاد وانتهت بعد سبعة وعشرين سنة。 لكن السؤال هنا ما دخل تاريخ اليونان القديم بما يحدث اليوم بين الصين وأمريكا؟ فخ ثيودسيديديز هو عندما تمثل قوة صاعدة تهديداً لقوة سائدة فاتحة المجال لتغير قوياً للقوى السائدة حالياً ومغيراً لنطام العالم。 وهو مشتق من صعود الدولة-المدينة أثينا ضد القوة السائدة إنذاك وهي أسبرطة الدولة القوية التي هزمت الإمبراطورية الفارسية بمساعدة أثينا مهد الحضارة اليونانية وانتهت الحرب بانتصار أسبرطة لكن نهاية الحرب كلفت الدولتين خسائر عظيمة ومكلفة أدت لنهاية الحضارة اليونانية。 ثيودسيديديز هو مؤسس السياسة الواقعية التي تنظر للحاضر من أعين التاريخ، فعلى مدار التاريخ الأوروبي حدث فخ ثيودسيديديز ١٤ مرة أثنى عشرة مرة حصل فيها الحرب。ونحن الآن على وشك تهديد خطير لوجه العالم الجديد حيث تمثل الصين القوة الصاعدة تحدياً مخيفاً لأمريكا صاحبت القوة المهيمنة على العالم ومؤسسة للنظام العالمي السائد。يبحث الكتاب في صعود الصين المفاجئ والسريع ومؤشر مخيف لاحتمالية حدوث حرب عالمية ثالثة。الكتاب رحلة تاريخية في تاريخ أوروبا المخزي والمدمر لدمار وتغير للقوى المسيطرة على أوروبا。فهو يبحث في الحروب الأوروبية وأسباب حدوثها。في الجزء الأخير يحاول الكاتب أن يضع اثنتا عشر فكرة للسلام تمنع قيام الحرب العالمية وهو ما يحاول الكاتب أن يصله。هل الحرب حتميَّة؟ وهل التاريخ يعيد نفسه؟ أم يمكننا أن نغير التاريخ لصالحنا ونمنع دمارنا بالقوة النووية فحروب العالم القديمة مجرد لعبة بسيطة أمام الحرب التي توشك أن تحدث。ملاحظات من منظار التاريخ :*من الأمور المضحكة التي إذا نظرت لها من منظار التاريخ أن الحرب العالمية الأولى والثانية قامت بشكل أساسي لمنع ألمانيا من السيطرة على أوروبا وكبتها من أن تكون أقوى الدول الأوروبية والآن ألمانيا هي أقوى الدول الأوروبية حتى البنك المركزي الأوروبي في ألمانيا للتاريخ غاية غريبة。 *أن الذي ساعد الصين على القيام هو انفتاح أمريكيا التجاري معها بعد أن ساءت العلاقة الحزبية الشيوعية بين الصين وروسيا فقررت أمريكيا أن تسحبها لصفها وهاهي قوة مهددة لأمريكا。 * أن الذي ساعد أمريكا على التطور وأن تصبح قوة عالمية محل بريطانيا هو انشغال بريطانيا بالمانيا حيث كان الألمان يطورون من البحرية العسكرية عندهم وكانت بريطانيا متخوفة من ذلك。 وكما ساعد الصين على التطور الاقتصادي هو انشغال أمريكيا مع روسيا بالحرب الباردة。 * اثناء الحرب الاهلية الأمريكية كانت بريطانيا تفكر بدعم الكونفدرالية الأمريكية التي تتمركز بالجنوب ولو حصل هذا لكانت أمريكا مقسمة ومنعت قيامها كقوة مهددة。 。。。more

Mexscrabbler ，

This book analyzes the relationship between China and the US， and suggests that a conflict between them may not be inevitable， although history suggests that it is likely。I found the book extremely informative， particularly the evidence which suggests that China has already become the defacto major world power by a variety of measures。 It is very frustrating， as an American， to see how the US wastes precious resources and is unable to get out of its own way to accomplish big things。I also found This book analyzes the relationship between China and the US， and suggests that a conflict between them may not be inevitable， although history suggests that it is likely。I found the book extremely informative， particularly the evidence which suggests that China has already become the defacto major world power by a variety of measures。 It is very frustrating， as an American， to see how the US wastes precious resources and is unable to get out of its own way to accomplish big things。I also found the reminder of the US' expansionism during the presidency of Teddy Roosevelt to be sobering and feel it is hypocritical to criticize other countries for behavior we have engaged in。The book was intersting and well written， but too long。 。。。more

George Crofts ，

An interesting comparison of the relationship between America and China and there Allie’s and the Peloponnesian war。

Fab ，

Insightful， well-documented and practical book to analyse the near future of geopolitics。

Alexandre Pelletier ，

It was interesting。 However， I find it was a long read to make this point。

Vicky ，

Graham Allison， a political science professor， uses the Peloponnesian War （Sparta vs。 Athens） as a starting point to take us through other examples in history of ruling power vs。 rising power。 He also sets us up to understand the rise of China， how the country operates， and what Xi Jinping wants。 It was fascinating to learn how the US compares in terms of similarities + differences。 I spent 12 hours 43 minutes not feeling upset at my dreadful house chores because I had this audiobook to keep me Graham Allison， a political science professor， uses the Peloponnesian War （Sparta vs。 Athens） as a starting point to take us through other examples in history of ruling power vs。 rising power。 He also sets us up to understand the rise of China， how the country operates， and what Xi Jinping wants。 It was fascinating to learn how the US compares in terms of similarities + differences。 I spent 12 hours 43 minutes not feeling upset at my dreadful house chores because I had this audiobook to keep me engaged。 There was a really bleak refrain used， which is about how after World War I happened， after nearly 20 million people died， someone asked the German chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg how the war could have happened， and he replied， "Ah， if only we knew。" The point is， there is a lot we can learn from the past and war between the US and China is not "inevitable。"Notes- now I wanna read Sun Tzu's Art of War- now I wanna purchase a Go board and play！- the American way of forgetting the past， problem-solving the present without a real strategy （just aspirational， impossible promises）， projecting into the future- the Chinese way of not forgetting about the past at all because it informs everything and thinking much， much longer-term so that as long as there are incremental inches advancing toward their favor， they will patiently ride through waves 。。。more

Gregory ，

10/10

Andrew Garrie ，

Very interesting analysis and definitely worth a read to gain a better perspective and understanding of the ongoing Chinese-US competition。 Very eye-opening in terms of what has already occurred and quite prescient in terms of some of the world events that have taken place since its publication。 This book makes a very strong case that armed conflict is likely to occur in the near future。 Allison does try and lay out a few options as to how it can be avoided but on the whole they seem unlikely co Very interesting analysis and definitely worth a read to gain a better perspective and understanding of the ongoing Chinese-US competition。 Very eye-opening in terms of what has already occurred and quite prescient in terms of some of the world events that have taken place since its publication。 This book makes a very strong case that armed conflict is likely to occur in the near future。 Allison does try and lay out a few options as to how it can be avoided but on the whole they seem unlikely considering they require changes to behaviour from both nations that are unlikely to happen。 This conflict is not going away and the West， specifically America， need to adapt quickly in one fashion or another or risk the entire world paradigm to change irrevocably in a fashion that will be extremely uncomfortable to Western inhabitants。 。。。more

Alvin ，

A fine overview of the history of rising nations versus established powers。 Allison then examines the current challenges between China and the USA。 He discusses the difficulties which lead to conflict and postulates some ideas which might avoid it。

Mike ，

Decent book on China/US relationship try to take historical power competitions into perspective to see if the relations falls into a Thucydides trap scenario

Song He ，

With history as our reference， the conflicts between China and US after the cold war is another example of the Thucydides' trap。There is little difference between the "Chinese dream" to modernize China and the American dream to "make American great again"。 After we have enjoyed peace for more than half a century， war is actually not far from us。 Although this booked was published two years ago， conflicts between the two nations continue to emerge in the past six months: US military plan flew ove With history as our reference， the conflicts between China and US after the cold war is another example of the Thucydides' trap。There is little difference between the "Chinese dream" to modernize China and the American dream to "make American great again"。 After we have enjoyed peace for more than half a century， war is actually not far from us。 Although this booked was published two years ago， conflicts between the two nations continue to emerge in the past six months: US military plan flew over the disputed area of the South China Sea on May 1; Hong Kong and Taiwan crisis; Economic conflicts and trade wars。 Now we need to add the debate on the origin of coronavirus。Due to different political systems and values， the peaceful handover of world power between Britain and US at the end of the 19th century won't occur for China US relations。 However， the trend of globalization and the high cost of nuclear war make war still avoidable to a great extent。The key to solve the problem is to know ourselves and our opponent， face the reality， and make policies and guidelines based on the core interests in the long run。 。。。more

Alexandru ，

Destined for War by Graham Allison is a book about the geopolitics between China and the US， specifically whether the two super-powers can avoid going to war and potentially destroying the whole world in the process。 The author places this geopolitical situation within the so-called Thucydide's Trap。 This 'trap' refers to the situation when a rising power （China） challenges an established power （USA）。 It was first noted by the Greek historian Thucydide in antiquity when the rising power of Athen Destined for War by Graham Allison is a book about the geopolitics between China and the US， specifically whether the two super-powers can avoid going to war and potentially destroying the whole world in the process。 The author places this geopolitical situation within the so-called Thucydide's Trap。 This 'trap' refers to the situation when a rising power （China） challenges an established power （USA）。 It was first noted by the Greek historian Thucydide in antiquity when the rising power of Athens challenged Sparta and the two states engaged in a devastating war known as the Peloponnesian War。Graham Allison notes that in the past 500 years there have been 16 such international situations and only in 4 of them the rival powers managed to avoid war （Britain and US in early XXth century， the USSR and Japan in the 70-80s， the USSR and US in the Cold War and UK-France and Germany in the 1990s）。 In the rest of the cases major wars broke out and one of the powers ends being defeated and losing its status of world power。 The best known cases are the Napoleonic Wars， World War I and World War II。China has experienced a 'century of humiliation' between the XIXth and XXth centuries which has left deep marks in the Chinese psyche。 The Communist Party has managed to raise China from its international humiliation and as such enjoys widespread legitimacy among the population。Since the opening of the Chinese economy to trade with the West the country's economy has grown at a staggering pace。 It is now larger than the US economy if measured in PPP。 If Chinese workers had the same level of productivity as their American counterparts the Chinese economy would be 4 times bigger than the US。 This staggering economic growth has led to China quickly becoming a world superpower and it is now challenging the US in technological， economical， cultural and military fields。 The Chinese leaders believe that now is the time for the country to claim its place among the world's superpowers and wash away the shame of the previous centuries。A few of the key takeaways of the book include:- China is challenging the American hegemony in Asia and the Pacific- China has a very long term view of geopolitics and history being able to postpone and prepare actions for generations， for example in the 1980s Deng Xiaoping postponed the resolution of a dispute with Japan for a generation in the hope that the next generations will be wiser and have better tools to deal with it- the US by contrast is all about achieving success in the moment and has a very short-term view of history- China sees government as the most important element of society and Confucianism's main tenet is 'Know thy place'。 As such， the citizens of China are seen as wheels in a greater system and their role is to further the state and their community。 China expects all of its people to work in the interest of the state and this includes even Chinese ethnics which are citizens of other countries- the US sees government as a necessary evil， individualism and distrust of government is embedded within the American way of thinking and even within the US Constitution。- the Chinese government and the state is controlled by the Party with the leader at the top - The US state is by definition built in such a way that no one person or organisation has the whole power。 This decisions are usually very slow and are easy to be blocked by various factions- China will not become a democracy due to the fact that the Communist Party has brought wealth and prosperity， the Tienanmen Square massacre is all but forgotten- the US has a very American-centric view of the world believing that the Western values of freedom and democracy should be exported to the whole world- China prefers expanding its influence using economic means， gradually drawing the countries around it into its sphere of influence without the need to use violent means- by contrast， ever since the US became a global superpower in the early XXth century it used military interventions to enforce its influenceThe author also deals with a few scenarios in which war could break out between China and America。 What all the scenarios have in common is the fact that despite the fact that both powers try to avoid war certain events happen which lead to an escalation of hostilities until all out war happens。 A war could break out in several situations:- an event directly involving China and America such as an American warship accidently colliding with a Chinese warship。 This could lead to Chinese retaliation and could escalate to all out war。- an event involving an ally of China and America such as the collapse of the North Korean regime and South Korea trying to reunify the country or the Japanese enforcing their claim on disputed islands。 In this case China or America will need to intervene on behalf of its ally and war could break out。- an event involving a nefarious third party such as a Russian hackers impersonating Chinese hackers doing a cyber attack on the US。 In this case the US might order a counter-strike against China's main cyber hubs triggering a military reaction。It remains to be seen whether war can be avoided as China's military becomes more and more powerful and its ships， bases and airplanes start encroaching on US interests in the South China Sea， Taiwan， Japan and beyond。 。。。more

David Williams ，

Great book to show why Trump was right about China and what， if anything， can be done。 Well worth the read with lots of great facts on how China is ahead of US in every area of society。

Sashi345 ，

一些個人從書中獲得的觀點：1。 修昔底德的陷阱是指堀起國隨著其實力提升而意圖獲得更多權利、話語權和其他國家的尊重，而守成國則對堀起國的權力提升而感到被威脅。堀起國試圖取代守成國，而守成國則打壓堀起國，導致雙方發生各種衝突。2。中美雙方的文化（文明）衝突導致大家難以互相理解和溝通。3。中美各自有國內問題需要解決，而雙方對峙導致資源錯配，無法解決自身更迫切的問題。

Khaled ，

كتاب رائع جدًا، أنصح كل من يهتم بالتنافس القائم حاليًا بين أمريكا والصين بقراءته。أشكر المُترجم المبدع إسماعيل بهاء الدين، تعليقاته الثريّة زادت فائدة الكتاب وأضافت لي الشيء الكثير。

Marco Aurélio ，

Livro muito bom， que trás no seu “core” a chamada “Armadilha de Tucídides" para o caso EUA x CHINA。 Um confronto inevitável que pode ser bélico ou não。 Depois de explicar a armadilha de Tucídides - o atrito criado quando uma potência em ascensão desafia uma potência estabelecida o autor passa a apresentar doze exemplos históricos que resultaram em guerra e quatro nos quais a guerra foi evitada。Uma das partes mais interessantes do livro é a aquela em que o autor retransmite as percepções do falec Livro muito bom， que trás no seu “core” a chamada “Armadilha de Tucídides" para o caso EUA x CHINA。 Um confronto inevitável que pode ser bélico ou não。 Depois de explicar a armadilha de Tucídides - o atrito criado quando uma potência em ascensão desafia uma potência estabelecida o autor passa a apresentar doze exemplos históricos que resultaram em guerra e quatro nos quais a guerra foi evitada。Uma das partes mais interessantes do livro é a aquela em que o autor retransmite as percepções do falecido Lee Kuan Yew ao defender que a meta de Pequim é a restauração da China como uma hegemonia regional。 Lee Kuan Yew enfatiza que que é errônea a ideia de que a China se tornará uma 'parte interessada responsável' no sistema internacional em que os EUA continuam a ser o árbitro。 A China busca a expulsão dos Estados Unidos da Ásia e está rapidamente acumulando capacidades para atingir esse objetivo。 Vale lembrar que a China era a grande potência do mundo até a Revolução Industrial e as Guerras do Ópio que trouxeram o país ao chamado século de humilhação （Século XX）， e que， inclusive， o governo de Xi Jinping usa como slogan para recuperar a autoestima do povo chinês tipo um “MAGA - Make American Great Again” versão chinesa。Conforme resenha da intrínseca， contextualizando o período Trump: “。。。enquanto uma China irrefreável desafia a já consolidada supremacia dos Estados Unidos， essas nações correm o risco de protagonizar um conflito de repercussão devastadora。 As promessas de seus presidentes de tornar seus países “grandes novamente” são a base da política externa de ambos e oferecem um vislumbre sombrio da construção do décimo sétimo cenário。 Conflitos comerciais， ataques cibernéticos， a crise da Coreia ou um acidente marítimo podem facilmente transformar os constantes desentendimentos entre as duas potências em uma guerra declarada。”Vale destacar que o livro acaba um pouco depois da metade e deste ponto em diante são explorados os 16 exemplos históricos， de forma resumida， para o meu deleite já que sou fissurado em história。 。。。more

Vicente Alti ，

Graham Allison es un historiador y académico realista de la Harvard Kennedy School。 La tesis de su libro se resume en la investigación que concluye que en la mayor parte de los casos en la historia， cuando un poder ascendente crece para desafiar a un poder dominante， habrá guerra。 Esta sería la trampa de Tucídides， expresada en las guerras del peloponeso entre Atenas y Esparta。Hoy， la guerra comercial disputada entre China y Estados Unidos es parte de un conflicto a escala global que remece a ci Graham Allison es un historiador y académico realista de la Harvard Kennedy School。 La tesis de su libro se resume en la investigación que concluye que en la mayor parte de los casos en la historia， cuando un poder ascendente crece para desafiar a un poder dominante， habrá guerra。 Esta sería la trampa de Tucídides， expresada en las guerras del peloponeso entre Atenas y Esparta。Hoy， la guerra comercial disputada entre China y Estados Unidos es parte de un conflicto a escala global que remece a ciudadanos， naciones y organizaciones internacionales。 Una observación como la de Allison podría llevarnos a revelar causas sistemáticas por las que dos países entran en conflicto y cuáles son las posibilidades que tenemos para morigerar esas tensiones。 。。。more

A。J。 ，

This is a great book that documents 16 cases over the last several centuries of history where rising powers threatened the displacement of a ruling power。 In four of those 16 cases， there was no war。 In many of the remaining 12， the ruling power declared war in order to prevent being displaced。 This book introduces the conflict between China and the United States and then offers compelling reasons why war is not necessarily inevitable between the two powers。 If you're looking for a more thorough This is a great book that documents 16 cases over the last several centuries of history where rising powers threatened the displacement of a ruling power。 In four of those 16 cases， there was no war。 In many of the remaining 12， the ruling power declared war in order to prevent being displaced。 This book introduces the conflict between China and the United States and then offers compelling reasons why war is not necessarily inevitable between the two powers。 If you're looking for a more thorough book about the rise of China or the background of the Sino-American conflict then I recommend reading The Hundred Year Marathon by Michael Pillsbury。 。。。more

Ray Hart ，

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Bill Pritchard ，

The relationship between the ascendant China and the United States is probably the most important single item towards the survival of the planet earth （no offense meant to my Global Warming Friends）。 A major war is something that may be quite easy to spark， whether it comes about from trade conflict， a cyberattack， a collision at sea between our two navies， or a misstep on the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan。Mr。 Allison has created a page turning look at this increasingly stressful relationship thru The relationship between the ascendant China and the United States is probably the most important single item towards the survival of the planet earth （no offense meant to my Global Warming Friends）。 A major war is something that may be quite easy to spark， whether it comes about from trade conflict， a cyberattack， a collision at sea between our two navies， or a misstep on the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan。Mr。 Allison has created a page turning look at this increasingly stressful relationship thru the eyes of the Thucydides Trap。 Within he not only lays out how we've arrived where we are， but concrete suggestions on how we could move forward。 If your eyes or soul are drawn to this conflict， this book is a must read - you will walk away with a better understanding of where China has come from and where it stands， how it views itself and the world around it， and how the United States will need to muster a combination of hard thinking and harder work - focusing on four core ideas: 1） Clarify vital interests， 2） Understanding what China is trying to do， 3）Do Strategy and 4） Make Domestic challenges central。 Highly recommended。 。。。more

Simon Randles ，

Thought-provoking， and adopts an interesting and persuasive model for consideration of US-China relations。 However， for reasons that are unclear， it excludes virtually any kind of contemporary Chinese perspective， instead focusing on contributions from the likes of Kissinger and other--primarily white and male--Ivy League voices。 The result is a book that feels like it tells only half the story， providing a good understanding of US perspectives on this issue， but asking the reader to rely on sec Thought-provoking， and adopts an interesting and persuasive model for consideration of US-China relations。 However， for reasons that are unclear， it excludes virtually any kind of contemporary Chinese perspective， instead focusing on contributions from the likes of Kissinger and other--primarily white and male--Ivy League voices。 The result is a book that feels like it tells only half the story， providing a good understanding of US perspectives on this issue， but asking the reader to rely on second-hand， foreign assessments of China's own interests and priorities。 。。。more

Hsien-Hsin Sean Lee ，

InsightfulI learned about Thucydides’s Trap the first time and this book from the founder of TSMC—-Dr。 Morris Chang during our quarterly executive meeting back in 2018。 Even though TSMC is in semiconductor manufacturing industry， Dr。 Chang gave a 2-hour in-depth analysis from his view for the growing confrontation between China and the United States and the implications of such geopolitical standoff to the semiconductor business。 This book instigated my own strong interest in international relat InsightfulI learned about Thucydides’s Trap the first time and this book from the founder of TSMC—-Dr。 Morris Chang during our quarterly executive meeting back in 2018。 Even though TSMC is in semiconductor manufacturing industry， Dr。 Chang gave a 2-hour in-depth analysis from his view for the growing confrontation between China and the United States and the implications of such geopolitical standoff to the semiconductor business。 This book instigated my own strong interest in international relations， in particular， regarding whether can the US maintain their leading influence in the Pacific in the 21st century。 It is a great book with insightful predictions。 China is trending toward their ambitious goal as described by the book while the US has waged a full-fledged technology war against China， leading both superpowers gradually fall into the trap。 。。。more

Thomas Lønn Hammer ，

Pretty good。 It taught me how war， sometimes， if not necessary， comes awfully close。 Pacifism， as an absolute dictum， no longer seems tenable。 As war is not something you get to decide over， it may arrive as an emergent phenomena that cannot be avoided。 Radical structural changes in the power dynamic pits the actors against each other， and the genius is finding out how to avoid what might seem inevitable。Anyway， is war between the US and China unavoidable？ No。 Are their trajectories on a crash c Pretty good。 It taught me how war， sometimes， if not necessary， comes awfully close。 Pacifism， as an absolute dictum， no longer seems tenable。 As war is not something you get to decide over， it may arrive as an emergent phenomena that cannot be avoided。 Radical structural changes in the power dynamic pits the actors against each other， and the genius is finding out how to avoid what might seem inevitable。Anyway， is war between the US and China unavoidable？ No。 Are their trajectories on a crash course？ Judging by historical examples， yes they are。 The US is a falling giant， while China is a rising star。 American exceptionalism is doomed not to like that outlook， but the fact is， the 21st century likely belongs to China， unless internal friction tears it apart。 。。。more

Matthew Barotz ，

really well-explained analysis of us-china relations， with clear historical examples and writing that was not too dense or fact-heavygenuinely one of the first nonfiction books i’ve actually enjoyed

Joseph Stieb ，

Kind of a misleading title， but a solid and reasonably short book about contemporary U。S。-China relations and the possibility of conflict。 The Thucydides Trap is the idea that， as in the Peloponnesian War， one of the most dangerous geopolitical dynamics occurs when a relatively declining power like the US faces the rising power of a country like China。 Not only does the declining power have to fear dealing with parity， multipolarity， and even a second class power status， their emotions and ident Kind of a misleading title， but a solid and reasonably short book about contemporary U。S。-China relations and the possibility of conflict。 The Thucydides Trap is the idea that， as in the Peloponnesian War， one of the most dangerous geopolitical dynamics occurs when a relatively declining power like the US faces the rising power of a country like China。 Not only does the declining power have to fear dealing with parity， multipolarity， and even a second class power status， their emotions and identity are often wrapped up in their hegemonic status。 You can see all of this in the US， which has been in relative decline probably since the 1980s as the world modernizes and the US runs into more and more disfunction at home。 In the meantime， the rising power often comes with a sense of resentment and humiliation over having been second or third fiddle for such a long time， and they often want to both take the top spot in terms of power and also revise the rules of the international game。 China， with its deeply rooted sense as the center of world politics and a superior civilization， definitely fits into this mold。This book does a great job exploring different T-Traps throughout history and explaining why some of these power transitions lead to conflict and others don't。 Most have throughout history， which is what makes them such dangerous moments。 Despite the book's title， he doesn't issue a clear judgment on CHina-US （very hard to do anyway） but explores where their interests and perspectives clash （he has an excellent chapter on culture and identity） and offers some well-thought out scenarios that might escalate into violence。 Overall， this book doesn't go way into the weeds on Chinese politics， grand strategy， and military policy， so it might not be a good "first book" to read on China-US issues。 But if you have a basic background， it's a clearly organized exploration of the issues from one of the leading scholars of strategy。 。。。more

Alexander Ruchti ，

Thucydides’s Trap states that when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power the resulting structural stress makes a violent clash the rule， not the exception。While initially formulated to explain the clash between Athens and Sparta multiple millenia ago， the author now makes a well thought through analysis on how it applies to the tensions between China and the United States today。The book is very well structured， analysing how the two superpowers came to the current situation and wha Thucydides’s Trap states that when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power the resulting structural stress makes a violent clash the rule， not the exception。While initially formulated to explain the clash between Athens and Sparta multiple millenia ago， the author now makes a well thought through analysis on how it applies to the tensions between China and the United States today。The book is very well structured， analysing how the two superpowers came to the current situation and what drives them。 The book looks at 16 similar cases of the last 600 years and highlighted which factors ultimately lead to war and which made a peaceful solution possible。 Out of the 16 examples， only 4 did not result in war （e。g。 Portugal vs。 Spain in the late 15th century and US vs USSR in the 20th century）。I have been going back and forth many times on whether to give 4 stars or 5 stars。 In the end， I settled on 4 stars （really liked it）， because the author was a bit to vague in the way he predicts the situation evolving。 Definitely worth reading！ 。。。more

Reference

google book https://www.google.com/search?tbm=bks&q=Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?

hathitrust digital library https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/ls?q1=Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?&field1=ocr&a=srchls&ft=ft&lmt=ft

The British Library https://bll01.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/search?query=any,contains,Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?&tab=LibraryCatalog&search_scope=Not_BL_Suppress&vid=44BL_INST:BLL01&lang=en&offset=0